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Double-edged rituals and the symbolic resources of 
collective action: Political commemorations and the 
mobilization of protest in 1989  
 
STEVEN PFAFF and GUOBIN YANG  
University of Washington; University of Hawaii at Manoa 
 
The year 1989 was rife with resonant political anniversaries in both Eastern Europe 
and China  as well as being the two-hundredth anniversary of France’s first great 
democratic revolution. Democracy and the future of socialism were on many 
peoples’ minds. Communist elites hoped to use these anniversaries as opportunities 
to celebrate the triumphs of the last forty years, but dissidents found these 
anniversaries even more auspicious as occasions to condemn “really existing” 
socialism. As a result, popular revolts erupted from Beijing to Berlin.  
A fascinating and generally overlooked feature of the 1989 protests is the role of 
political commemorations in the mobilization of protest. In both Eastern Europe 
and China, students and dissident groups took to the streets in connection with 
historical anniversaries, funerals, or memorial services and staged public 
expressions of discontent to which a broader, relatively unorganized, and 
previously uninvolved populace responded. Judged by the standards of much social 
movement theory, this kind of protest activity seems irregular and unconventional. 
Why did opposition groups rely so heavily on political commemorations? Was the 
appearance of protest around anniversaries and other public events nothing more 
than a spontaneous emotional display, a reaction to political opportunities, or 
simple coincidence? Do these incidents suggest certain patterns of protest 
characteristic of authoritarian regimes? Or do the movements of 1989 point to a set 
of as yet unrecognized but important sources of movement mobilization?  
In this article, we consider political commemorations as ritual practices and 
explain why under certain conditions such practices may be used to mobilize 
protest in authoritarian regimes. Political rituals are important political indicators 
in authoritarian societies because they are public events in societies that are 
generally privatized and because they provide a relatively accessible indicator of 
social and political conflicts in societies in which repression and dissimulation 
often obstruct sociological research. Our argument is developed through a 
theoretical discussion of 1) the double-edged character of social rituals; 2) the 
conditions of collective action in state-socialist regimes; 3) the uses of rituals for 
staging protest; and 4) political commemorations as symbolic resources in 
collective action.  
 
These theoretical arguments will then be applied and further developed in an 
analysis of the role of political commemorations in the popular protest movements 
in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and China in 1989. These cases are chosen 
precisely because they were politically hardline regimes in 1989 in which the 
resources and opportunities for collective action were the most circumscribed. In 
these cases, the factors that supply the mechanism of political opportunity in 
conventional accounts of the 1989 protests such as regime liberalization, easing of 
domestic repression, or an open split between party reformers and hardliners were 
either absent or so attenuated as to provide little explanatory power.1 They are also 
useful for comparative purposes because of the variations in political culture, 
institutions, and the outcomes of mobilization against the state. Taken together, our 
theoretical and empirical arguments illustrate the ways in which collective actors 
exploit political commemorations to launch social protest. We try to specify the 
role of culture in collective action rather than simply assert it as a determining 
structure. Likewise, we move beyond a voluntaristic account of action, by 
specifying the ways in which cultural practices enable and constrain actors in order 
to advance current social movement theory and generate propositions that can be 
employed analytically in understanding symbolic resources of collective action. 
 
Double-edged rituals  
The “cultural turn” to the study of collective action entails an emphasis on cultural 
resources. These resources include, among others, symbolic practices such as 
language and imagery, cultural “tool kits” such as stories and rituals, information 
and codes, injustice frames, and historical events as politically defining symbols 
and channels of emotional expression that mobilize and sustain action.2 
 
The focus on cultural resources of collective action gives new prominence to ritual 
practices, an important area of study in cultural sociology. In Durkheim’s (1915) 
terms, rituals are social practices that produce and reproduce symbolic goods along 
with moral and emotional attachments to a social order. For Durkheim, rituals are 
spontaneous phenomena that have the latent effect of producing functionally 
integrative solidarity. Some rituals, such as public holidays, produce consensus and 
counteract disintegrative forces in social life as latent effects of purposeful 
collective expression. There are also distinctly political rituals; social practices 
designed by states and political movements to reinforce social power or produce 
collective sentiments through honoring symbols and objects held up as sacred. 
Political rituals are predominantly public events, unlike some private religious or 
ethnic rituals that are performed at home, in seclusion or in sheltered spaces. 
Despite these differences, the elementary logic that defines things as sacred in 
political terms is the same as that for more general social phenomena.3 
 
In communist societies the near deification of socialist leaders such as Lenin, 
Marx, or Mao and the respect accorded the “holy” texts and ideas of the party 
through public statements and mass demonstrations are other examples of rituals 
reinforcing political power. All of this serves to sacralize the state, inspire sacrifice 
and loyalty on its behalf, and accord its subjects an aura of authority and respect. 
Thus modern societies, like traditional ones, can have a political life suffused with 
symbolism and ritualized action. Many of these symbols and symbolic practices 
are meant to establish or reinforce a collective sense of political identity, or the 
authority and prestige of leaders, institutions, and ideologies.  
 
Rituals, however, are not simply top-down carriers of cultural meaning and 
conduits of social action. They have a double-edged character that can empower 
collective action. Rituals intended to preserve and strengthen the established order 
may unintentionally sponsor protest against it. Even in an authoritarian setting 
where political meanings cannot be freely contested, rituals can be redirected to 
express criticism of the system. Various studies have shown, for example, how 
rituals that publicly celebrate and reinforce social order may be carriers of social 
movements.4
 
 The work of Victor Turner suggests that there is something intrinsic 
to the structure of rituals and their experience that can threaten the established 
social order by removing individuals from their daily routines. Turner argues that 
rituals have both an integrative and anti-structural dimension, focusing particularly 
on how rituals have the power to inspire deviance and rebellion by temporarily ren-
dering relations of power transparent and making the maintenance of social 
structure reliant on collective action.5 
 
Drawing on Turner, Nicholas Dirks notes, “ritual constitutes a tremendously 
important arena for the cultural construction of authority and the dramatic display 
of the lineaments of power” but at the same time rituals “often occasion more 
conflict than consensus, and that each consensus is provisional, as much a social 
moment of liminality in which all relations of power (and of powerlessness) are up 
for grabs.” Indeed, Dirks argues, it is partially because of the two-sided character 
of the ritual order that resistance to authority and unexpected rebellion may appear 
in spite of state repression.6 
 
In her study of the cult of leadership in Assad’s Syria, 
Lisa Wedeen shows how in providing a symbolic world in which relations of 
domination are always on display “the cult and spectacle both produce political 
power yet also, paradoxically, invite transgressions.”7
 
 It is in this sense that one 
can speak of political rituals as potential moments of vulnerability for an estab-
lished political order and as symbolic resources of collective action for would-be 
challengers.  
 
These reflections allow us to generate our first proposition: Political rituals render 
relations of power transparent and rely on enactments of social domination. As a 
result, official political rituals have a double-edged character that reinforces 
relations of domination while simultaneously providing aggrieved actors with 
opportunities for dissension.  
 
The question for students of collective action is, “Under what conditions do rituals 
generate protest against domination rather than its reinforcement?” Rituals do not 
automatically channel collective protest. While the polysemy of a ritual or symbol, 
or the historical memory associated with it, may contain rich possibilities for 
interpretation and creative appropriation, it is up to actors to make strategic use of 
them. Whether and how actors make use of rituals to mount political protest cannot 
be understood independent of the social conditions in which the actors are situated. 
In the following section, we discuss the conditions of collective action in 
authoritarian societies with special reference to state-socialist regimes. 
 Conditions of collective action in authoritarian regimes 
Collective action in authoritarian regimes differs from that in democratic regimes 
in three crucial respects. In modern authoritarian regimes, most of the resources of 
collective action are controlled by the state; in democratic regimes, they are more 
diffuse. Secondly, authoritarian regimes generally seek to raise the costs of 
independent collective action to levels that are intolerable for most of the people 
most of the time through means of surveillance and repression. Finally, democratic 
regimes tolerate peaceful and orderly opposition emerging from an autonomously 
generated civil society while authoritarian regimes actively intervene in civil 
society and obstruct citizen mobilization. Historically, authoritarian regimes have 
been arrayed along a continuum between those that permit a limited degree of 
political pluralism and autonomous economic and cultural organization and those 
that enforce a nearly complete organizational monopoly in which no significant 
source of social, political, economic, or cultural pluralism is tolerated. In moderate 
forms of authoritarianism, there may be some limits on state power and sufficient 
space for a semi-opposition in society. In the more extreme, totalitarian forms, 




The Leninist regimes that control state-socialist societies combine bureaucratic 
authoritarianism with charismatic mobilization. The communist party is a vehicle 
of impersonal charisma with control over the state apparatus. These regimes 
maintain that a single party, empowered by a world historical theory of utopian 
social change, cannot tolerate ideological or political deviations that threaten social 
stability and long-term prospects for human development. Public institutions are 
fully subordinated to party control and have no identity other than party interests. 
There is no meaningful plurality in society because the party organization controls 
the state, the economy, and every important sphere of public activity. Social 
mobilization behind regime goals is directed by mass organizations that are also 
subject to party controll.9  In short, Leninist societies can be understood as 
“impoverished” collective action regimes in which the resources of collective 
action are monopolized by elites, leaving potential challengers weak, marginalized 
and with inadequate endogenous opportunities for action.10
  
 
The differences between the conditions that obtain in authoritarian and democratic 
regimes have far-reaching implications for understanding collective action in 
socialist societies. Where resources of collective action are monopolized by the 
state, organized opposition groups, which by definition have to depend on material 
and organizational resources to exist, are difficult to form and develop. Even 
worse, the monopoly of resources of collective action means that any emergent 
form of organized opposition groups will be carefully monitored and controlled by 
the state apparatus. The state’s high capacity for repression makes direct 
challenges to state power unlikely and significantly deters even indirect challenges. 
Dissident groups may form despite the risk of repression, but even if they may 
sympathize with dissident goals, ordinary people typically stand clear of such 
groups, leaving them relatively isolated. With opportunities for effective 
independent action so constrained, most people retreat as far as possible into the 
private sphere.11 
 
Without organizational and material resources, and faced with high levels of risks, 
how can collective protest be possible in state-socialist regimes? Social movement 
scholars have given much attention to this question. Two insights are particularly 
relevant to the issues of our concern. First, while public life is largely controlled by 
the party and the state in state-socialist regimes, private life and informal associa-
tions are found to provide “free spaces” for nourishing dissent, building networks 
of solidarity, and defining subversive identities.12 
 
Rather than organized political 
movements directly challenging the regime, “subcultures of opposition,” 
subversive communities and loosely-organized dissident groups that are hard to 
track are more typical forms of opposition in highly repressive regimes.13 
 
In times 
of crises, these informal groups may be transformed into useful organizational 
resources of collective action.14 
 
A political subculture shares many of the norms, ideas, and values of the dominant 
society but is distinguished by a host of dissident ideologies, attitudes, and 
behaviors.15 In authoritarian regimes, membership in dissenting political 
subcultures has potential consequences for the fate of the individuals involved. 
Yet people with dissident sentiments or ideological attachments join such groups 
because they provide them with perceived advantages such as the pooling of 
scarce information and material resources, opportunities for exchange and mutual 
support. Often, but not exclusively, members of the cultural intelligentsia are the 
foundation of political subcultures. These groups typically engage in such 
activities as forming informal discussion circles, writing protest letters and 
circulating petitions, and printing and distributing samizdat texts. Since heterodox 
ideas and values cannot be readily expressed outside of such groups and because 
these groups are illegal or suppressed, they tend to be informal and tightly knit. 
The sense of community within such groups and the resulting solidarity are 
generally strong because they are based on personal ties and are small enough to 
provide a unique identity.16  Free riding is discouraged both by high initiation 
costs and by the informal social control provided by the regulation of intimate 
social networks that provide the foundation of such groups.17
  
Even the experience 
of an arrest or a beating by police may establish the moral credentials of the 
dissidents and reaffirm their solidarity to one another.18
  
 
In authoritarian regimes, these subcultures must worry about visibility. They will 
generally try to find social niches in which to operate without direct surveillance. 
Thus, to ordinary citizens the existence and activities of political subcultures will 
generally be opaque, their direct influence on public opinion limited. In more 
totalitarian regimes, secret police agencies generally find it relatively easy to 
detect these subcultures, infiltrate them, and eliminate them through arrests. 
Although the historical evidence suggests that totalitarian social control never 
managed completely to eliminate submerged opposition arising from political 
subcultures, totalitarian regimes can effectively neutralize the threat represented 




Why do people seek out free social spaces or join political subcultures, especially 
in a repressive setting where such activities invite sanctions of one kind or 
another? All forms of governance provoke grievances and discontent. But 
repressive regimes by definition try to obstruct the expression of grievances or the 
effective use of collective action to redress them through surveillance, 
intimidation and coercion. Subcultures form because marginalized individuals and 
groups identify with heterodox ideologies and lifestyles, or find themselves 
defined as deviant by the dominant regime.20  Some seek out free social spaces to 
pursue their material and ideal interests or express their preferences for alternate 
norms and values. The more repressive the regime becomes, the more likely that it 
will generate grievances, reinforce dissenting identities, and provide incentives to 
seek redress through available means. As a result, although the authoritarian 
regime may encounter few public challenges, it may confront a more diffuse 
opposition in submerged, discontented groups that outwardly conform to the pre-
vailing order.  
 
The formation of political subcultures in response to grievances and constraints on 
public expression of discontent can be seen as an action generating mechanism in 
collective action.21
 
In the political process model, political opportunities are the 
primary causal mechanism to account for movement emergence. In our analysis, 
we see political opportunities as a necessary cause of movement emergence in 
repressive settings, but identify a prior, necessary step in the formation of informal 
groups and associations bearing heterodox ideologies. However, owing to the 
legacy of repression and only very limited organizational preparation, these groups 
may be weak in terms of the endogenous resources identified by the political 
process model as necessary for movement emergence. Given these obstacles, 
symbolic resources that can be appropriated from the dominant regime or 
generated through the political subculture itself are developed as substitutes for the 
more typical material, communicative, and organizational resources employed by 
nascent movements in democratic polities.22
  
 
So long as repression remains continuous and effective, political subcultures 
cannot effectively transform themselves into social protest movements and 
opposition will remain submerged. Political subcultures will not be transformed 
into protest movements under an effective, repressive, and consolidated regime, 
but if social control is less than complete, members of political subcultures will 
seek out free social spaces. It is during such periods that ordinary citizens who 
have not previously been involved in dissident groups will more readily express 
grievances. It has been argued in the case of China that the party state’s reliance on 
official political campaigns and mass mobilizations to deal with social, political 
and economic problems is itself a potential source of protest. As Xuegang Zhou 
puts it, “Participating in state initiated political campaigns provides an opportunity 
for individuals and groups to pursue their own agendas and exploit new oppor-
tunities. State-initiated political campaigns provide opportunities for unorganized 
groups and individuals to act together.”23 
 
Subcultures can be transformed into movements when opportunities for collective 
action and public expression of heterodox viewpoints multiply as a result of 
declining repression (as a result, for example, of regime liberalization or the decay 
of coercive capacity) and expanding spaces for independent collective action. 
Dissidents attempt to multiply their resources by extending existing means or 
devising new ones. At the same time, declining repression provides new 
opportunities for previously unaffiliated individuals to identify with political 
subcultures. In addition to their own informal groups, dissidents will attempt to 
expand the free social spaces at their disposal by penetrating formal state 
institutions if they can redirect resources to mobilizing social protest. Much has 
been written on how, in the context of destabilizing market reforms, Chinese 
students subverted the official bureaucratic institutions of the university for 
purposes of mobilization in 1989.24 
 
Another example of how subcultures can expand into opposing social movements 
can be seen in Hank Johnston and David Snow’s analysis of the rise of nationalist 
movements in the Soviet Baltic, which traces the shift from popular 
accommodation to opposition in the context of the declining authority of the Soviet 
state. For most of the historical period of the Soviet occupation, the challenge to 
authoritarian rule was provided not by parties or movements, but by subcultures of 
opposition located on the margins of public life, such as within cultural 
associations and intellectual circles. Johnston and Snow argue that, in the context 
of declining repression and broadened institutional access accompanying reform, 
some previously accommodating groups were radicalized into a more defiant 
opposition. This suggests that, given sufficient popular disaffection from the 
regime and declining state control, a relatively narrow opposition based in 
dissident subcultures can become the basis of popular mobilization against the 
state. In the case of the Baltic republics, as new opportunities for political expres-
sion opened up under Gorbachev, the dissidents were already armed with a rich 
arsenal of symbolic weapons and staged highly visible, emotionally charged 
demonstrations in spite of their continuing organizational weakness. These 
demonstrations apparently did much to generate mass support for liberalization 
and, later, secession from the U.S.S.R.25 
 
Analyzing the conditions for opposition in impoverished collective action regimes 
allows us to generate our second proposition: To varying degrees authoritarian 
regimes systematically obstruct aggrieved individuals and groups from engaging 
in collective action. However, if social control is less than total, small subcultures 
of opposition will develop in spite of the costs. Dissidents within these subcultures 
will seek out whatever free social spaces are available to them to mount 
opposition to the regime. Given adequate resources and the eroding effectiveness 
of repression, protest movements will develop out of political subcultures.  
 
We recognize that the existence of informal groups and oppositional subcultures 
and the possibility of using state institutions and practices for purposes of protest 
are crucial conditions for the rise of collective protest in state-socialist regimes. 
We argue, however, that the resources available to political subcultures are quite 
limited, as are the organizational niches from which they operate. For these actors 
to mount a collective challenge to state authorities, they would still need 
additional resources. Where material and organizational resources are relatively 
lacking, symbolic resources assume great importance.  
 
Using public rituals to stage protest  
Historical dates and commemorations of cultural heroes are taken as occasions to 
stage protests in a variety of settings, not just in authoritarian ones. In 
contemporary democratic societies where protest has become routine, the presence 
of disruptive protesters may even become part of the political ritual itself.26 But in 
many authoritarian states, these symbolic resources may be the only significant 
ones that opposition movements can exploit. Given their interest in maintaining 
order and denying collective actors a forum from which to challenge the regime, 
why do state elites take the risk of building political rituals around events like 
historical anniversaries that might be exploited by dissidents? We think that this 
stems from the structure and ideology of many authoritarian regimes. Political 
commemorations are important elements of political cultures in which state--
directed mass mobilization and large-scale cultural events are the key forums for 
state legitimation.  
 
Leninist regimes may be particularly vulnerable. Even if elites recognize the 
inherent dangers of large-scale public events they find it difficult to eliminate 
them. This is because publicly staged political rituals as manifestations of party 
power and enactments of public acclamation are such a central element of the 
political culture of Marxism-Leninism. Leninist elites require occasions on which 
to announce new policies, glorify regime achievements and seek ritualized public 
affirmation. This is part of the paradox of what Ken Jowitt has called Leninism’s 
“charismatic bureaucratism.”27
 
In Communist regimes, these heavily scripted 
public events are designed to display the power and unity of the party and the 
broad popular support it enjoys; producing what James Scott calls “self-portraits” 
of elites as they would like to be seen.28 Just as important as the content of the 
ritual itself is the fact that by taking part in the scripted events the subordination of 
the people to the party is confirmed. Indeed, it is compliance that such rituals 
demand rather than genuine conviction or emotional investment.  
 
So even if people privately view these rituals quite cynically, by going along with 
them only “as if” they did believe, they help to maintain the system through 
enactments of subordination and conformity that signal to others that social control 
remains intact.29 
 
But because they provide incentives to falsify one’s true 
preferences and loyalties, public displays of popular unity and assent may lead 
elites to overestimate their own support and underestimate the submerged potential 
for rebellion. Time and again in 1989 this led political elites to make damaging 
miscalculations.30 Among ordinary citizens these ritualized affirmations may 
actually focus discontents, as they see and hear the representatives of the regime 
praise and affirm policies they believe to be mistaken or false. At the same time, 
knowing that a crowd will be present, dissidents have a readymade occasion to 
stage a protest guaranteed to draw at least some public notice.  
 
Thus, while official rituals may be important to the maintenance of political 
domination, under some circumstances they may also be moments of jeopardy for 
authoritarian regimes. Even in the absence of other dimensions of political 
opportunity, a number of factors may make the regime vulnerable during official 
commemorations: (1) their highly symbolic importance for elites, dissidents, and 
the broader citizenry; (2) the fact that they rely on public assemblies and gatherings 
that are either banned or tightly controlled under ordinary circumstances; and (3) 
they generate heightened expectations and focus discontents among citizens. That 
this kind of event can unintentionally generate protest is especially likely in cases 
where discontents are generalized and dissenting subcultures have formed but 
regime surveillance and repression have prevented the formation of an opposition 
movement or organized parties. If a movement relies heavily on subverting official 
rituals, this suggests the organizational weakness of dissidents and the absence of 
an independent civil society from which they can operate. The fact that the 
movement must piggyback on official political culture suggests the inadequate 
capacity to communicate an alternative set of values, symbols, and ideologies.  
 
Because of the advantages they offer, public events such as national holidays, 
official assemblies and rallies, political funerals, and the visits or addresses of 
prominent statesmen all have a tendency to become occasions for protest in 
authoritarian settings, even when the risk of retaliation for participation remains 
high and favorable opportunities to achieve a desired collective end are absent or 
imperceptible. This is because the capacity of political rituals to generate publicity 
provides a strong incentive for dissident groups to risk protest. In general, it is true 
that public events, particularly those covered by the mass media, have a tendency 
to generate spontaneous popular reactions and heightened expectations that 
something could happen.31 This alone does much to increase the possibility that 
contentious collective action of some kind will result from large-scale public 
events no matter what the conditions of the political environment, even if the level 
of repression or facilitation will likely influence the nature of those manifestations. 
In short, there was often no relaxation of social control or repression and no basis 
for a changing calculus of perceived efficacy in many of the incidents of collective 
action that we have observed in the early stages of the movements of 1989. There 
was, however, a stable set of incentives built around political commemorations for 
those who wished to express and generate public manifestations of dissent. Given 
the capacity of dissident groups to act collectively, they tend to respond to these 
incentives as long as they expect to reach an adequate audience relative to the risks 
that they are assuming.  
 
This leads to our third proposition: nascent protest movements in authoritarian 
regimes have few opportunities for effective action and are generally resource 
poor, operating chiefly within the sheltered niches provided by free social spaces. 
Dissidents attempt to counter this weakness by exploiting the doubled-edged 
character of official political rituals. Because grievances can be expected to be 
more widely generalized than the dissident subculture, public displays of 
opposition draw wider public support when opportunities for protest are provided 
by dissident activism.  
 
We expect that if an authoritarian regime obstructs movement emergence but is 
held in low public regard, anniversaries and similar dates with political and cultural 
resonance become occasions for commemoration and thereby protest in state-
socialist regimes. Such dates have the advantage of drawing large numbers of 
people into the streets for official celebrations (such as those for May Day or the 
anniversary of the founding of the state) and are widely known to be politically 
significant without requiring publicity work by opposition groups. People with 
what Zhou calls “unorganized” grievances are likely to be present on such dates, or 
knowing the significance of the date, the discontented will turn up in some public 
place in the hope of encountering likeminded people. The effect of public 
manifestations of dissent may be electric as actors begin to realize that their 
grievances are shared outside of their own private circles. What gives these 
incidents their explosive potential is that at a large-scale event uncoordinated 
groups may respond at the same time, widening the protest and undermining the 
authorities’ attempts to suppress or disperse demonstrators. In this way, small 
demonstrations in repressive regimes may signal to the broader public that 
dissident sentiments are more widely shared than relatively isolated actors had 
realized. Once these signals have been communicated, small demonstrations of 
discontent can give rise to cascade effects and rapidly widening protest that is not 
easy for the authorities to suppress.32 
 
Political commemorations and protest mobilization  
Politics is not merely a struggle over interests, access, and advantages, but also 
over meanings and communication. Official or state-sanctioned commemorations 
of politically significant dates include rituals surrounding national independence, 
the founding of the state, the end of a war, the birthday of a political leader or 
national hero, or the death of an exemplary leader or political martyr. Official 
commemorations are meant to reinforce the regime, although, as we have seen, 
they may unintentionally encourage dissent. Rituals may be used to stage protest 
and when protesters try to disrupt state rituals a struggle over symbolic goods and 
their content is at stake. Dissenting voices try to frustrate or undo the process by 
which the sacred is collectively defined and experienced. Protesters who disrupt 
official commemorations are attempting to deny the regime a chance to reproduce 
the social order and generate sacred goods needed for their legitimacy.  
 
Part of the importance of rituals is that they help to constitute “repertoires” of 
collective action.33 State political rituals are often designed to elaborate prescribed 
forms of political participation and expression. Some states even establish a 
“charismatic” political culture heavily reliant on public stagings of state power and 
enactments of sentiment and loyalty. Mabel Berezin, for example, has shown how 
a “repertoire of ritual” developed in Fascist Italy that shaped public events and 
nourished a highly emotional politicallife.34
 
The political culture of Communist 
states, nurtured in the same climate of inter-war mass movements and agitprop 
mobilization, reveals a similarly highly ritualized presentation of political issues 
and an attempt to generate support through spectacular displays of regime 
accomplishments and manifestations of the putative “unity of the people and the 
party.” These occasions present political subcultures with an opportunity to 
assemble or to stage counter-protests that are likely to attract public attention. 
Dissident intellectuals may try to reframe or invert the existing meaning of sacred 
notions or political icons that have been officially endorsed by the regime. 
Officially sanctioned commemorations have the advantage of being linked to 
public gatherings, marches, parades and the like organized by the authorities. 
Dissidents may initially disguise their opposition in the form of “politically 
correct” rhetoric or by approved historical references, and protest associated with 
official events are more likely to take the form of appropriation rather than outright 
rejection of official ideology.  
 
It is not just the double-edged nature of official public rituals that arms dissidents 
with opportunities for action and symbolic resources of protest. Given adequate 
openings, political subcultures may develop unofficial, dissident commemorations. 
These rituals help to communicate dissident values and goals to the wider 
population and provide them with a recognizable set of claims and practices that 
they can adopt for themselves. Once a protest movement is forming, rituals may 
also be used to generative collective solidarity and a repertoire of collective action. 
Given sufficient protected space to organize their activities, dissidents may also 
succeed in creating their own opposing political rituals linked to implicit or explicit 
criticism of the system and try to present them before the public.  
 
Official commemorations are external to political subcultures; they represent 
externally provided opportunities within the structure of regime supported political 
culture. Meanings are contestable, but the dates themselves are not. They belong to 
a recognized cycle of holidays and public events. This means that these 
commemorations correspond, in part, to the concept of opportunity in the social 
movement literature. At the same time, because there are rituals and symbolic 
goods associated with these commemorations, they also provide a set of symbolic 
resources that challengers can employ, redirect, reframe, or challenge in a public 
forum. These events present both opportunity and resources for dissident 
movement challengers. Official commemorations around events such as historical 
anniversaries can be understood both in terms of culturally provided opportunities 
for collective action and in terms of symbolic resources of collective action.  
 
At official commemorations, state-sponsored rituals may be disrupted and regime 
sponsored meanings associated with them contested. Official commemorations of 
historical anniversaries, sacred events and political heroes generally involve a 
crowd mobilized or organized by the state to provide an audience for speeches or 
appeals. From the regime’s standpoint, the purpose of the crowd is to provide 
public assent to the regime’s policies and symbolic support to the regime. 
However, because official commemorations require a crowd assembled in a public 
place, dissidents may be afforded much wider access to fellow citizens than would 
usually be the case. In addition, such events may both heighten the effectiveness of 
protest activity while lowering the potential costs by making arrest more unlikely. 
This has to do, in part, with the advantages of anonymity in a large crowd. 
Moreover, public commemorations will generally attract media attention, including 
foreign journalists. This means not only that a wider audience can be reached, but 
that cost of repression for the state is raised.  
 In terms of symbolic resources, anniversaries and other sacred events may generate 
expectations of great discontent among intellectuals and ordinary people, 
inadvertently deepening grievances as the gap between the official rituals 
conducted by the regime are seen to contradict the lived reality of the regime. The 
language of commemoration connected with such events also provides a 
vocabulary of protest useful to dissidents. But official commemorations of this 
kind have the disadvantage of making it difficult for activists to communicate their 
real goals and messages. As Dingxin Zhao notes of the Chinese students, “to avoid 
immediate repression, students tended to hide their real demands and goals behind 
safer and more culturally congenial forms of action.” As a result, their opposition 
to the regime had a message relying much more on national traditions and socialist 
values than many of the democracy activists intended. This reflected the 
organizational weakness and lack of coordination among multiple dissident groups 
trying to mobilize support.35
  
 
As social movements emerge out of political subcultures, dissidents not only 
exploit the advantages of official commemorations, but also create their own.36 
Non-official, or even banned commemorations of persons and events that are 
ignored or repudiated by the regime may become rallying points for political 
subcultures, especially in the absence of effective communication networks. As 
Karl-Dieter Opp has observed of Eastern Europe,  
Anniversaries of events, where blatant regime repression was exercised or citizen 
protests occurred in the past, were opportunities for many citizens to gather at central 
places. An example is the anniversary of Jan Palach’s protest by setting himself on fire, 
when many people gathered at Wenzel Square in Prague. Such events generate 
expectations that many other people will gather at central places of a city.37
  
 
This second type of commemoration, however, may be less likely to draw wide 
public attention. Such dates and their significance may be well known in dissident 
circles, but almost unknown to ordinary citizens who rely on personal networks or 
the state-controlled media for information. It may be easy to rally the members of a 
political subculture on an anniversary that is highly salient to the group’s identity, 
but whatever protests are staged may be largely self-referential, lack public 
resonance, and be much more easily detected, prevented, or suppressed by the 
authorities. These unofficial commemorations also require greater communication 
and movement framing on the part of dissident forces prior to protest actions than 
does disrupting existing official events. Dissident commemorations may thus 
require greater resources and political access than piggybacking on state rituals. As 
a result, such commemorations may fail to attract attention, result in ineffective 
protests, and invite regime repression. If there has been inadequate communication 
between dissident groups and the broader public, even a widely observed dissident 
commemoration may do no more than evoke a vague sense of historical tragedy 
from ordinary citizens.  
 
Given these disadvantages, the point of dissident commemorations is less to 
mobilize a direct challenge to the regime so much as to generate symbolic 
resources of collective action. These rituals articulate a set of alternative sacred 
symbols and icons for use of the opposition movement itself.38
  
Participation in 
politically alternative rituals may serve purposes of “re-identification”; helping to 
create and renew commitment, solidarity and identity among the movement 
participants themselves.39 Commemorations of fallen heroes, of historically 
resonant dates, and of regime atrocities also serve as periodic occasions for 
members of dissident groups to gather together and reinforce their common 
project.40 In this way, although they typically have far less public resonance than 
official commemorations, protest rituals are potentially productive of a set of 
symbolic resources by and for the movement itself that help to sustain solidarity in 
the face of repression and the often highly unlikely prospect that the repressive 
regime will give way anytime soon.  
 
Both types of commemorations may serve the purposes of organizational and 
cognitive preparation for mobilization. Friends may decide to use such an 
occasion, for example, to call on the government to release a political prisoner. 
Historians may write commemorative articles to rekindle the spirit of the heroic 
past. Social critics may take the occasions to analyze contemporary social 
problems. Secret gatherings as well as open academic conferences are held. In 
other words, as Opp suggests, the prospect of a coming anniversary or similar 
occasion may bring together people with common interests to talk about issues of 
common concern. Thus, in the absence of formal dissident organizations, 
commemorations of events like anniversaries indirectly serve the purpose of 
organization and consciousness raising.  
 
Unofficial commemorations may be less auspicious for the development of a 
protest movement because the opportunity dimension is either weaker or absent. At 
the same time, however, the rituals connected with unofficial commemorations 
may be especially productive of symbolic goods and solidarity that directly 
benefits the dissident community. Unofficial commemorations are occasions that 
are meaningful to movement participants and can be used to generate movement 
identity and solidarity. Unofficial commemorations provide for the self-
representation of isolated, stigmatized and, politically heretical groups in 
opposition to official condemnations. These rituals tied to political 
commemorations help to establish a movement repertoire. Thus dissident 
commemorations provide resources that help to generate further resources, such as 
movement solidarity, political identity, and a repertoire of symbolic objects and 
practices connected to the movement. Even if the unofficial commemoration is 
disrupted or dispersed by police repression, this may still have the desired effect of 
strengthening internal solidarity through recommitment and establish the moral and 
political qualifications of the dissidents.  
 
There are numerous historical examples of the process by which alternative publics 
and dissident subcultures are structured around political commemorations and their 
associated rituals in authoritarian regimes. One is how Poland’s Solidarity activists 
made extensive use of commemorations in the mobilization of working class 
support. Despite police repression and the arrest of activists, in December 1978 
and 1979, the Committee for Free Trade Unions staged commemorative services 
for the scores of victims of the December 16, 1970 massacre of protesting workers 
in Gdansk’s Lenin Shipyards. As the regime began to give way to Solidarity’s 
demands, a symbolic expression of this was made on December 16, 1980 when 
government representatives and Roman Catholic clergy joined Lech Walensa and 
union leaders at a service in memory of the 1970 strike and officially consecrated 
its victims as martyrs. Even after the declaration of martial law and the crackdown 
against Solidarity, the memory of 1970 remained fixed in the popular imagination; 
the experience of the joint commemorations demonstrated the enduring legitimacy 
of the movement.41 
We are now led to our last proposition: The importance of official (double-edged) 
political rituals in authoritarian regimes is that they present opportunities for 
collective action that can be exploited to bring dissident issues to a broader public. 
Unofficial commemorations arising out of political subcultures are employed by 
dissident groups to generate symbolic resources of collective action including 
movement identification, member solidarity and a repertoire of recognized 
practices.  
 
In Eastern Europe’s “velvet revolutions” of 1989, ritualized commemorations 
provided key elements of the collective action repertoire. This repertoire included 
commemorative ritual elements such as candlelight processions and silent marches 
in memory of political prisoners or victims of repression, the signing of hymns and 
anthems, and gatherings outside of churches and other well-known, symbolically 
charged locales (e.g., cemeteries, public squares, in the shadow of national 
monuments). Similarly, in China during the spring of 1989, student activists 
employed large-character posters connected with mourning and other 
commemorative rituals to turn the unexpected death of a party leader to their 
advantage. Although officially banned commemorations may fail to achieve the 
same degree of public recognition as protest staged during official 
commemorations, they may be more important as a source of alternative symbols, 
practices, and collective experiences that aid movement emergence. In time, 
authoritarian regimes may come to expect challenges during state-sponsored rituals 
and in response to significant dates in the dissident calendar and increase the police 
presence and surveillance in response. Indeed, we see precisely such reactions by 
the authorities in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and China.  
 
 
Political rituals and the 1989 protest movements  
In our analysis of the democracy movements of 1989 in China and Eastern Europe, 
we find that political commemorations contributed to mobilization mainly in two 
ways –on-the-spot mobilization in response to opportunities for protest and the 
organizational and ideational preparation that upcoming anniversaries occasioned 
within political subcultures. These events are summarized in Table 1. In the 
remainder of this article we provide an analysis of the role of political 
commemorations as symbolic resources of collection action in both Eastern Europe 
and China in 1989. The enumeration of these events is not meant to suggest that 
the contingent of anniversaries in 1989 caused the movement to happen. Nor do 
we claim that the ways these anniversaries were used in the course of the 
movement provided the only resources of movement mobilization. We do want to 
argue, however, that as symbolic resources, the historical anniversaries in 1989 
provided crucial resources for mobilization in another sense. In the absence of 
organizational resources, they provided the necessary cultural and ideational 
preparation, albeit in an unintended fashion. It is important to note that the reliance 
on political commemorations to provide dissident rhetoric and to mobilize protest 
generally points to the weakness of movements in these societies and their need to 
piggyback on state organized events and culturally acceptable rhetoric and actions. 
We will then draw some conclusions concerning the structure of opposition in 
state-socialist regimes and suggest the ways in which greater attention to cultural 
processes can yield benefits for social movement analysis.  
  
Eastern Europe in 1989  
In the late 1980s, socialist regimes experienced mounting economic difficulties and 
new sources of political vulnerability. The failure of party elites to contend with 
widening economic problems and popular dissatisfaction with living standards 
fueled growing political unrest and eroding legitimacy even within the ranks of the 
ruling parties. At the same time, expanding economic and cultural contacts with 
Western societies and the penetration of foreign media made socialist regimes 
vulnerable to international public opinion. The ability of the hardline party-states 
to manage the crisis was further undercut by Gorbachev’s advocacy of reform and 
political liberalization that seemed simultaneously a challenge to party authority 
and an encouragement to dissidents. Both those hardline regimes that endorsed 
market reforms (China) and those that rejected them (GDR, Czechoslovakia) expe-
rienced increasing difficulty maintaining political control and policing dissent. 
Given increasing popular discontent and a changing political environment -most 
prominently the “Gorbachev factor”  dissidents in both Eastern Europe and 




As Przeworksi has observed, by 1989 Communist ideology in Eastern Europe was 
becoming a threat to the system it was meant to legitimate. This was not only 
because Marxism-Leninism provided a ready yardstick to measure inequality and 
domination against the rhetoric of utopia, but because the organized public rituals 
that were a central feature of communist political culture began to generate more 
conflict than consent. The struggle around political rituals in Eastern Europe was 
not only one that involved conflicts over ideology, but also over the control of 
public spaces where political rituals are enacted. Largely excluded from the mass 
media and from institutions, public places such as city squares and streets were the 
key arena for the movement for democracy and human rights in Eastern Europe.  
 
Public demonstrations were significant for a number of reasons. First, they took the 
risky step of moving outside the narrow confines of Church-supported 
organizations or political subcultures and brought dissident issues before a wider 
public. Second, they directly challenged the party’s claim to a monopoly on 
political expression and organization. And third, they drew international attention 
to internal sources of dissent that otherwise might be nearly invisible to outsiders 
and opaque to fellow citizens. Often, public demonstrations revolved around 
political commemorations of one kind or another. In some cases, state-sponsored 
rituals and assemblies such as May Day were disrupted by dissidents. In other 
cases, opposition groups organized commemorations of their own. These 
commemorations became not only opportunities to engage in protest, but also to 
raise public awareness by stirring collective memory of past crimes committed by 
the regime or of nationalist heroes and martyrs of the past.  
East Germany  
In East Germany political subcultures formed under the umbrella of the church, the 
only autonomous institution in communist society. These subcultures took shape in 
the 1970s and 1980s focusing on such issues as pacifism, the environment, 
women’s rights and, somewhat belatedly, human rights. In the late 1980s, as 
liberalization took hold elsewhere in the Soviet bloc and Gorbachev signaled his 
support for reform, East German dissidents began to organize a loose human rights 
movement of their own.
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Despite the liberalizing international climate, however, 
the GDR’s leadership under Erich Honecker categorically rejected emulating 
Soviet reforms and suppressed internal opposition.  
Despite the regime’s political intransigence, in January 1988 human rights activists 
in East Berlin tried to stage a public protest on the anniversary of the murder of the 
socialist martyrs Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. However, the group had 
been previously infiltrated by secret police informants who reported the plans for 
the protest to their handlers. Police agents intercepted the dissidents on their way to 
the official parade commemorating the heroes and arrests were made. As a result, 
the protest did not take place, the human rights group that planned the event was 
broken up, and several dissident leaders were arrested and expelled to the West. In 
addition, considerable damage was done to opposition networks in the GDR. 
Despite their failure, word of the attempt became public knowledge once West 
German television  widely available in the East  reported on the arrests and 
expulsions.  
A year later, opposition groups in Leipzig, a large industrial city in East Germany, 
succeeded where their Berlin counterparts had failed. On the eve of the seventieth 
anniversary of the murders, a coalition of activists calling itself the “Initiative for 
Democracy” secretly distributed hundreds of flyers around the city demanding the 
right to free expression, assembly, and the press and calling for a demonstration at 
the city’s central market square during the state Luxemburg-Liebknecht 
commemorations. This time, because the Leipzig group had not been infiltrated by 
police informants, the dissidents succeeded. On January 15, 1989 an estimated 
eight-hundred people assembled at the market square and listened as a dissident 
proclaimed, Socialism without unlimited freedom of opinion and the press is 
impossible. That was and remains the central message of Rosa Luxemburg.”  
Following this, dissident groups led the crowd on a protest march to the Karl 
Liebknecht memorial. They were confronted by police, who forcefully dispersed 
the march and made more than one hundred arrests. Several organizers were 
detained and threatened with lengthy imprisonment, prompting smaller 
demonstrations demanding their release on January 16 and January 23. The 
Luxemburg-Liebknecht protest was the first such event organized by Leipzig 
groups that drew a larger number of participants from outside the dissident 
subculture than from within it.
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Although the organizers of the demonstration were 
threatened with long imprisonments, because the protest happened at a major 
political event it generated publicity both within the Church-based opposition in 
the GDR and internationally, leading to the surprising release of the dissidents after 
only a week of captivity.
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Their release encouraged further efforts to stage 
demonstrations. 
Why did the relatively isolated dissident groups in Berlin and Leipzig choose this 
particular historical anniversary as occasions for protest? The 
Luxemburg¬Liebknecht anniversary was one of the holiest dates in the socialist 
calendar of the GDR. It involved public speeches by party leaders, newspaper 
editorials, television coverage of marches and memorial processions, wreath-laying 
at monuments, and similar political rituals. Indeed, the rituals connected with the 
martyrdom of Luxemburg and Liebknecht linked the regime to the canonized co-
founders of the German Communist Party murdered by reactionary offers after the 
failed “Spartacist” uprising of early 1919. The tragic figures of Luxemburg and 
Liebknecht still had the capacity to generate considerable sympathy as true 
examples of socialist conviction and revolutionary virtue, but the official 
commemorations had become so highly scripted as to be almost devoid of genuine 
commitment or enthusiasm. Party officials were instructed to round up participants 
and were given detailed instructions on what slogans should be shouted in the 
processions before the party tribunal.
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Although official commemorations in the 
GDR had largely degenerated into a subtly coerced show of support for the regime, 
the anniversary of the murders remained one of the country’s holiest days. A large 
crowd of people including Western journalists was assured in the downtown streets 
of the major cities.  
Dissidents seized on the Luxemburg-Liebknecht commemorations for all the 
practical reasons noted above, but also because they were trying to appropriate 
symbolically these official martyrs for their own cause. Indeed, GDR human rights 
activists took as their motto Luxemburg’s statement that “Freedom is always the 
freedom of those who think differently”  a virtual dissident manifesto declared 
by one of the regime’s founding heroes. With tensions rising within the GDR stem-
ming from the East German party’s rejection of glasnost and perestroika, using 
Luxemburg to frame human rights issues had greater resonance. Taking advantage 
of public events centered around historical anniversaries helped to mitigate the 
weaknesses of the East German opposition and the disadvantages it faced in 
confronting the state, but this alone did not radically tip the balance of power in its 
favor.  
 
The East German regime also recognized that official commemorations were a 
resource that opponents could exploit and tried to minimize this advantage. But as 
much as the regime obstructed the loose opposition groups from coming together 
as a cohesive movement, it could not stamp out the discontent that gave rise to 
protest, nor could it completely retreat from the public rituals that sustained an 
increasingly strained regime. Following the attempted demonstration at the 
Luxemburg¬Liebknecht commemorations in East Berlin in January 1988, a party 
security analysis argued that in the future “public forums” must be denied to the 
opposition. An important part of this was that they should be prevented from 
taking advantage of important dates and public events to stage protests, concluding 
that: “In general, political vigilance must be increased. It must be taken more 
seriously that hostile forces will be taking the opportunity to misuse cultural 
assemblies, historical dates and social events.”
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This was a significant worry, 
especially in light of the coming fortieth anniversary of the GDR that was being 
planned as a celebration of socialist triumphs and the “unity of the people and the 
Party.”  
 
Unofficial commemorations also occurred during 1989, but they remained small, 
relatively isolated events centered on the dissident subculture. In Leipzig, 
dissidents held commemorative protests on at least two significant occasions prior 
to the revolutionary turn of events in the fall of 1989. In June, members of church-
based environmental groups staged a “memorial” march to protest the destruction 
of the local environment. This demonstration centered on the mourning ritual to 
dramatize the destruction of the Pleisse River that had once flowed through the 
town until it grew so polluted that it had to be redirected and entombed. This time 
an estimated four-hundred people took part in the march, resulting in seventy-four 
arrests. A second wave of protest activities occurred in Berlin and Leipzig in July 
in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre and the GDR government’s official 
praise of the action. In Leipzig, church-based dissidents used the occasion of a 
Lutheran Church congress meeting on July 11
th 
to commemorate the victims of 
repression in China. Carrying a banner that read “Minzhu-Demokratie” about two-
hundred protesters condemned the party leadership for endorsing the Tiananmen 
crackdown and demanded the recognition of human rights in the GDR.
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While 
both of these events had considerable local importance in the development of the 
Leipzig opposition movement, given the tight grip the state still maintained they 
failed to generate broader public participation and had limited resonance outside of 
dissident networks.  
 
Official political commemorations again played a crucial role in the development 
of broader popular opposition once the state faced a general political crisis that 
affected all GDR citizens. The expansion of protest outside of dissident subgroups 
was triggered by events in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the founding 
of the GDR in early October. During the summer of 1989 new holes in the Iron 
Curtain opened by the reform-minded government in Budapest provoked the 
GDR’s highly destabilizing “exiting crisis” of tens of thousands of mostly young 
people fleeing westward or occupying West German embassies in neighboring 
socialist states.
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To stem the tide of refugees, the government announced that the 
border with Czechoslovakia would be sealed on October 3
rd
. In the midst of this, 
the recently established New Forum opposition group used the occasion of the 
approaching anniversary to appeal to the party for reform and the legalization of 
independent citizens’ movements aimed at “renewing” and “enriching” 
socialism.
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Instead of acknowledging pressures for reform, the party organ Neues 
Deutschland infuriated many East Germans by denouncing the exiters as immoral 
people who had “cut themselves of from society,” adding that the GDR “would not 
shed a single tear” for those who left.
51  
 
The timing of the exiting crisis and the state’s ill-received reaction to it coincided 
with the long-planned, carefully orchestrated official celebrations of the GDR’s 
anniversary. In Berlin on the evening of October 6
th
, a hundred thousand party 
members and socialist youth marched in processions celebrating forty years of 
victorious socialism and listened as party leader Erich Honecker boasted that the 
Wall could stand for another hundred years to protect this “outpost of peace and 
socialism in Europe.” By contrast, the speech by the visiting leader of the Soviet 
Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, called for democratization and openness to the great 
acclaim of the audience.
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Encouraged by Gorbachev’s visit, a small, dissident-led 
protest march formed parallel to the official commemorations. As the evening 
progressed, spectators and even participants drawn from the masses of people at 
the official ceremony crossed over to join them. Shouting “Gorby, Gorby,” the 
protesters were met by troops and police forces that used batons and dogs to break 
up the demonstration. Now their shouts turned to “Gorby, help us!”  a cry 
audible on the official podium and widely reported on in the Western media 
available to most East German households. Scores of people were injured and 
hundreds of arrests were made before order could be restored, turning the 
celebration of forty years of “heroic socialism” into an embarrassing fiasco that 
discredited Honecker and signaled the weakness of his government.  
 
In cities outside Berlin, the regime’s attempts to celebrate the successes of forty 
years of socialism were similarly upset. Spontaneous demonstrations of tens of 
thousands in Leipzig, Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Halle, and Plauen brought shared 
grievances and a sense of outrage into the streets where they were often magnified 
in confrontation with a brutal security apparatus. Uncoordinated groups of young 
people clashed with police and injuries were widespread. In all, the Interior 





Thousands of angry, previously uninvolved citizens whose 
grievances had been suddenly magnified by the exiting crisis and by government 
brutality at the fortieth anniversary protests began to recognize the vulnerability of 
the regime and joined the protests. When this began to happen, the pace of popular 
mobilization increased dramatically and in the weeks following the anniversary, 
demonstrations in Leipzig and other cities swelled from a few thousand to 
hundreds of thousands. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November the collapse 
of the regime became immanent.  
 
The disruptive protests at the fortieth anniversary commemorations turned the 
political rituals associated with the anniversary upside down. Instead of being an 
occasion to trumpet the virtues of socialism and of the regime, it became an 
opportunity to criticize and attack the regime. In effect, the regime was insulted at 
its own birthday party by its own guests, including the guest of honor. Intended as 
a stabilizing display of the unity of the party and the people, the official 
celebrations of East Germany’s birthday turned out to be a spontaneous display of 
popular anti-Communism. Celebrating the anniversary in a way that was oblivious 
to the concerns of ordinary people forced them to confront the fact that the state 
had persisted for decades without solving many of the country’s fundamental 
problems and now failed to serve their interests. Once people began to turn away 
from prescribed participation and expression, manifestations of discontent became 
ever more common and Communist control over the public sphere rapidly 
collapsed. At this point, short of a bloody crackdown, it had become nearly 
impossible to reverse the eroding power of the party. A few days later on October 
9, seventy-thousand people chanting “We are the people” marched through the 
streets of Leipzig and, unable to rally sufficient support for a crackdown within the 





Czechoslovakia, like East Germany, went into 1989 with a highly repressive post-
Stalinist regime that distanced itself from Gorbachev’s reforms. There was little 
indication that the hardliners were giving way. Czech intellectuals had formed a 
number of dissident groups (most famously Charter 77) and enjoyed some support 
within cultural associations but they were isolated from the public. Intellectuals 
like Vaclav Havelsaw few prospects for a democracy movement and hoped for no 
more than gradual liberalization. However, as in the GDR, international events 
created new opportunities for small dissident groups to take action. In 
Czechoslovakia, like the GDR, commemorations of historical anniversaries played 
an important role in mobilizing protest beyond small, isolated dissident 
subcultures. Czechoslovak dissidents, student groups and ordinary citizens were 
able to make use of state-sponsored political rituals to stage protests and also 
developed a rich repertoire of ritual commemorations of their own devising that 
helped to compensate for their severe organizational weaknesses.
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Anniversaries of historically resonant dates and patriotic figures are especially 
significant in the Czech case. In August 1988, on the occasion of the twentieth 
anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion that brought the liberalizing “Prague 
Spring” to an end, Czechoslovakia witnessed the largest demonstration against the 
regime since the Dubcek era. Chanting prodemocracy and pro-Gorbachev slogans, 
about ten-thousand demonstrators, chiefly students and young people, filled 
Prague’s central Wenceslas Sqaure demanding that the regime publically 
acknowledge that Warsaw-pact intervention had been a criminal act. Riot police 
responded to the “illegal provocation” by dispersing protesters with tear gas and 
batons. On October 28, 1988, the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of the 
first (“bourgeois”) Czechoslovak Republic, an estimated five-thousand demon-
strators again filled the square chanting “Freedom! Freedom!” and “Masaryk” (the 
founding president of the 1
st 
republic) and waving the national colors in defiance of 
the authorities. Again, the police responded with force resulting in scores of arrests 
and injuries. On the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights on December 10, an officially recognized commemoration was organized 
by the state to coincide with the visit of the French president. Again protest 
occurred, this time when some five-thousand demonstrators hijacked the event, 
denouncing Communist polices. However, this time the police were shackled by 
the international visibility of the visit and by the official nature and topic of the 
event and thus held back from violent repression.   
 
If 1988 had been inauspicious for the regime because of the anniversary of both the 
1918 founding of the democratic republic and the twentieth anniversary of the 
1968 invasion, 1989 was also rich with symbolic historical anniversaries. The year 
1989 contained both the twentieth anniversary of the suicide protest of Jan Palach 
and the fiftieth anniversary of the murder of student activist Jan Opletal by Nazi 
occupiers.  
The memory of the student activist Jan Palach was a central element of the 
dissident subculture in Czechoslovakia. Palach, a nationalist student, set himself on 
fire in Wenceslas Square to protest Soviet military intervention and the suppression 
of the “Prague Spring” on January 16, 1969. Three days later Palach died of his 
injuries. For the next several days, Palach’s death provoked demonstrations 
throughout Moravia and Bohemia, including by peaceful crowds at his burial in 
Prague on January 25. The following day, a large demonstration against Soviet 
intervention and the state’s new hardline course was dispersed by riot police and 
about two-hundred people were arrested. The following year, in January 1970, 
police forces raided homes and detained about fifteen-hundred people in order to 
break up dissident networks aimed at organizing commemorations of Jan Palach’s 
death. Because his suicide was associated with smashed hopes for reform and the 
national humiliation of foreign invasion, over the intervening years the date 
became an orienting point in the loosely organized dissident groups.  
On January 15, 1989, demonstrators gathered to commemorate the twentieth 
anniversary of Palach’s death. During the commemorations, several thousand 
protesters clashed with the police who used beatings, tear gas, and water cannons 
against the demonstration. Ongoing clashes with the police led to six days of 
sustained protest and more than a thousand arrests. Among those arrested were 
Vaclav Havel and a number of leading dissidents, whose arrests disrupted 
organizing but proved helpful in generating national and international support for 
the network of opposition groups. Dissident groups circulated open letters calling 
for the release of Havel and the other political detainees that were eventually 
signed by more than two-thousand intellectuals A shortened version of one of these 
letters entitled “Several Sentences” called for an end to political repression, 
freedom of speech and assembly, and an official reevaluation of the events of 
1968. By August, about forty-thousand Czechoslovak citizens had signed the 
petition.  
Months later at the official May Day celebrations dissident groups again organized 
demonstrations against the regime. After reformist regimes in Hungary and Poland 
expressed regret over their participation in the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, thousands of people took to the streets to protest Communism, 
including delegations of Hungarian and Polish dissidents. On October 28, despite 
police efforts to detain potential organizers, an estimated ten-thousand people took 
part in unofficial commemorations of the seventy-first anniversary of the 
republic’s independence in Wenceslas Square. In both cases, the police responded 
with force and dispersed the demonstrations. It was becoming clear, however, that 
despite ongoing repression of dissent, opposition to the regime seemed to be 
spilling out of the small dissident milieu into the broader ranks of citizens. The 
demonstrations of the previous months had helped to generate a host of new civil 
rights, environmental, religious, and student groups that joined in calls for reform 
and denounced police brutality. Moreover, the dissident-led historical 
commemorations rekindled collective memories of the painful and humiliating 
history of the country and underscored Czechoslovakia’s political and economic 
stagnation.  
In the summer and fall of 1989 events in East Germany and elsewhere in the 
Eastern bloc further encouraged Czechoslovaks to keep up the pressure. With the 
fall of Honecker’s regime in October, the Czechoslovak hardliners appeared out of 
step and without close allies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in early November 
signaled the end of the post-totalitarian era, creating widespread expectations that 
there had to be movement in Czechoslovakia, too. On November 17, the pace of 
anti-regime protest was quickened when a government sponsored commemoration 
of antifascist martyr Jan Opletal (killed by the Gestapo in 1939) in connection with 
“International Student’s Day” was taken over by a parallel demonstration led by 
students. A new organization of independent student groups hailed Opletal as a 
patriotic hero who had fought foreign occupation. Holding their own ceremonies, 
student groups cheered speakers denouncing the government, sang the national 
anthem, and laid flowers at a cemetery. Soon, the demonstration grew more 
stridently anti-Communist with some fifty-thousand taking part in a march through 
the city center. Confronted by police and paratroops, the demonstration became 
violent and resulted in scores of injuries and arrests.  
 
The demonstration on November 17 proved a turning point. The following day, 
theater workers went on strike to protest the brutal treatment of protesters. 
Outraged by the political immobility of the regime and the brutality of its 
repression, demonstrations continued to grow. On November 19, an estimated two-
hundred-thousand people filled Wenceslas Square, and on November 23, three-
hundred-thousand filled the city center in Prague and seventy-thousand in 
Bratislava. In the midst of this, the small and fragmented opposition rapidly organ-
ized, calling for peaceful protest and a nationwide general strike to display the 
popular opposition to the government. During a two-hour warning strike on 
November 27, millions of workers joined in a stunning display of opposition to the 
regime. Acknowledging the regime’s utter lack of support, the Communist 
government resigned and the new regime was sworn in on December 10. Seven 
days later, demonstrations commemorating the student victims of police beatings 
on November 17 turned into rallies calling for Havel’s election to the presidency. 
With his election, the post-Communist history of Czechoslovakia began.  
 
China in 1989  
Historical memory is of profound importance in Chinese politics. In the early days 
of the economic reform, at the turn of 1978 and 1979, Chinese intellectuals and 
ordinary citizens debated about the necessities of democratic political reform by 
referring both to the (largely negative) recent history of the Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution and to the more distant ideals of the May Fourth Movement, ideals of 
science and democracy that the May Fourth generation learned from European 
romanticism and the French Revolution.56
 
Much of the debate took the form of 
historical allusions and critiques of contemporary realities, but in spirit it was 
future oriented. Political democratization was presented in plans and blueprints, of 
which Wei Jingsheng’s “Fifth Modernization” is probably the most prominent 
example.  
 
By 1989, ten years after China’s economic reform took off, it would be about time 
for a historical review. Three sets of factors exacerbated the urgency of such a 
review. On the one hand, the economic reform seemed to be confronted with 
severe difculties. The most visible symptom in 1988 was an exorbitant inflation. 
On the other hand, political reform was making no progress either. The anti-
spiritual pollution campaign in 1986, which cost Hu Yaobang his position as the 
Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, remained fresh in the public 
memory, even as the cultural scene was recovering among intellectual debates 
about the values and shortcomings of Chinese culture and tradition.  
 
On top of these two sets of factors loomed the imminent arrival of a whole series 
of big and small historical anniversaries. Mostly written into school textbooks and 
thus well-known to young and old, these anniversaries were often used as 
occasions to reinforce patriotic sentiments by the Chinese government. For many 
Chinese intellectuals and ordinary citizens, they were also occasions for moral and 
cultural reflections. This was particularly true of those with activist orientations. In 
1988, these “cultural activists,” as they have been called, felt that they would face 
so many round numbered historical anniversaries in 1989 that it was their moral 
responsibility to respond to these important dates.57 As Su Xiaokang, one such 
cultural activist, put it in an article published in May 1988:  
The year 1989 is destined to be a singular memorial year which meets many historical 
giants: It is the bicentenary of the French Revolution; the centenary of the founding of the 
Second International; the 70th anniversary of the May 4th Movement; the 70th anniversary 
of the founding of the Third International; the 40th anniversary of the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China; the 30th anniversary of the Lushan Conference; the 20th 
anniversary of the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China; the 20th 
anniversary of the death of Liu Shaoqi; and so on. No one can escape these coming days 
of the year which may make you happy or unhappy one way or another.58  
 
The various responses that these cultural activists were to make in 1988 and 1989 
eventually turned out to be organizational and ideational preparations for the rise 
of the student movement. To be sure, there were no concrete plans for starting a 
social movement. Nor were there explicit efforts at organizing. Yet the cultural 
debates that were developing in 1988 in anticipation of the arrival of 1989 not only 
created small islands of individuals with various kinds of informal networks among 
them, but also created a general cultural milieu in favor of thorough-going cultural 
and political critiques of Chinese reality. When the anniversary dates came one 
after another in 1989, they quickly activated the networks and general milieu into 
necessary resources for large-scale collective action. In what follows, we first 
review a few examples of cultural activism that took place before the democracy 
movement started on April15, 1989. We then show how activists made explicit use 
of anniversaries during the movement. Our purpose is to show that 
commemorations of historical anniversaries contributed to movement mobilization 
both before and after the movement started. 
 
Together with a group of other cultural activists, the abovementioned Su Xiaokang 
made crucial, though probably unintended, cultural preparations for the 1989 
Chinese student movement through the production of the documentary TV series 
River Elegy.59
  
First aired in June 1988, River Elegy depicted the tortuous process 
of Chinese modernity in startling images and metaphors. In contrasting a Chinese 
culture represented by the poverty of the yellow earth to an open and vibrant 
Western culture symbolized by blue seas, the authors of the series rekindled the 
fiery critique of traditional culture once launched by activists of the May Fourth 
Movement.60 
 
The series met with unexpected success. Within two months of the first airing, 
River Elegy was aired a second time, in August 1988. By this time, Party 
conservatives had become aware of the critical power of the documentary. Under 
the charge of propagating cultural nihilism, the documentary was finally banned. 
But the damage, so to speak, had been done. Nationwide debates on the 
weaknesses and strengths of Chinese culture spread, much as the debates on the 
weaknesses and strengths of Confucianism had spread in the years prior to the May 
Fourth Movement. These debates were not just occasions for the exchange of 




The political calendar for the last days of 1988 and the first few months of 1989 
read like a book of bad omens for China’s party leaders. In early December 1988, 
on the decennial of the Democracy Wall Movement (1978-1979), a veteran activist 
of that movement, Ren Wanding addressed an open letter to several international 
human rights organizations requesting an investigation into the conditions of 
Chinese political prisoners jailed because of their involvement in the Democracy 
Wall Movement. Also in early December, the cultural activist Jin Guantao declared 
to a student symposium on the “Future of China and the World” that “the socialist 
experiment and its failure will be, together with the collapse of Western centrism, 
the two major legacies of the twentieth century to mankind.”62 Meanwhile at a 
national symposium on China’s ten year reform efforts, Su Shaozhi, director of the 
Marxist Leninist Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, attacked the 
shortcomings of the socialist system.63
 
The January 1989 issue of the popular 
magazine China Youth carried an article by the same Su Shaozhi entitled “What 
Will the Year 1989 Tell Us?” He concluded that “No Chinese of conscience can 
fail to recognize the fact that democracy and science in China today are extremely 
incomplete.”64
 
On December 30, 1988, a high profile conference was held in 
Beijing on “The Cultural Crisis and the Way Out of It.” On this occasion, Le 
Zehou, another influential cultural activist, extended his understanding of the 
cultural crisis to an impending social crisis: 
Mainly the crisis is not cultural, but ... social. Aside from economic problems, there are 
also problems of social order and ecological problems, including water shortages, 
pollution, misuse of chemical fertilizers, the decline in the fertility of the soil, loss of 
control over population growth, and so forth. Not only are these present-day crises, but 
there is also turmoil hidden in the future.65
  
 
The year 1989 again opened with open letters and petitions. On January 6, Fang 
Lizhi wrote an open letter to Deng Xiaoping to call for the release of Wei 
Jingsheng, who had been jailed since the 1979 Democracy Wall Movement. 
Another open letter followed on February 16, this time signed by thirty-three 
celebrity intellectuals. The letter proposed that the Chinese government should 
grant special pardons to China’s political prisoners on the occasion of two 
important anniversaries in modern Chinese history:  
We are deeply concerned upon hearing of the open letter to Chairman Deng Xiaoping by 
Mr. Fang Lizhi on January 6, 1989. We believe that, on the occasions of the fortieth 
anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic and the seventieth anniversary of 
the May Fourth Movement, a general pardon of political prisoners, particularly the 
release of political prisoners like Wei Jingsheng, will create a harmonious atmosphere 
favorable to the reform. It will also conform to the widespread trend of increasing respect 
for human rights in the world today.66
  
 
This open letter was followed by another on February 26. Signed by forty-two 
scientists and academic journal editors, it explicitly called for accelerated political 
reform. On the part of the Chinese government, no efforts were made to meet the 
demands for democratic reform articulated by these cultural activists. Nor was 
there any attempt to suppress these influential voices. The consequences were two-
fold. On the one hand, the open and public form in which these cultural activists 
expressed their demands contributed to the influence of their ideas. On the other 
hand, the state’s apparent tolerance of the cultural criticisms, many of which 
targeted the socialist system, signaled a softened official attitude and gave rise to 
higher expectations. This created a situation favorable to collective action. We do 
not deny that complex factors might be behind the creation of such a situation. One 
strategically important factor, however, was that cultural activists were able to 
seize the moment of forthcoming historically important anniversaries to make 
further political demands. While cultural activists contributed to the rise of the 
democracy movement through cultural activities that provided organizational and 
ideational preparation, once the movement started, activists and movement leaders 
made conscious use of significant historical dates for mobilization purposes. 
 
To begin with, the movement started in a way that confirms our view of the 
importance of political commemorations. It was triggered by an event with deep 
historical resonance and commemorative power in the minds of Chinese students. 
The death of Hu Yaobang on April15, 1989 was as unexpected to Chinese students 
as it was unambiguously suggestive: it was the death of a relatively open-minded 
and reform-oriented leader who suffered his political downfall in 1986 because of 
his sympathy with the student unrest in that year. Twelve years before, in 1976, the 
death of another popular leader Zhou Enlai had triggered the April Fifth 
Movement, the first major popular uprising since the heyday of the Red Guard 
Movement in the mid-1960s.  
 
In 1989, students lost no time in seizing the moment to mourn the dead leader. 
Political commemoration in the form of ritualized mourning was a legitimate 
practice by official conventions and the state did not have a good excuse to ban it. 
Immediately after the news of Hu’s death spread to the universities, wall posters 
mourning his death and protesting against the injustices he had suffered appeared 
in large numbers on campuses in Beijing. These events quickly pushed the students 
out of their campus into the streets. On April18, 1989, a group of students made 
their first attempt to submit a list of demands to the government, asking for the 
reevaluation of Hu Yaobang, among others. One of the most effective uses of 
official rituals by movement organizers occurred on April 22, the day officially set 
for Hu’s funeral ceremony. Following the funeral ceremony, crowds of students 
gathered in front on the Tiananmen Square, in front of the Great Hall of the People, 
where the funeral had taken place, to demand dialogue with government officials. 
Three student representatives crossed the police line and knelt down on the stairs 
of the Great Hall to present a petition in the style of a courtier presenting a 
memorial to an emperor in earlier times. The meanings of this symbolically 
challenging and emotionally explosive gesture have been discussed elsewhere.67
 
What is important for our immediate purpose is that this symbolic act generated an 
immediate emotional solidarity and commitment to the movement among those 
present. A student leader from Beijing University recalls:  
That afternoon, as my friends made their way back from the square, they told me angrily 
that the representatives had knelt for forty minutes, but no one had ever come out of the 
Great Hall. The officials had left through a back door. One of my old roommates said 
through clenched teeth,  “If I had a cannon, I would have blown up the Great Hall of the 
People.” Almost everyone who had been there was as angry as he was. The students had 
given a reasonable and patriotic request to the government, but the Party officials had 
completely ignored them. I noticed that many students who had never cared about politics 
and protest before were now raising their fists in the air. That day was one of the turning 
points of the movement.
68  
 
The rest of what happened from then to June 4 is now quite well-known.69
 
In a 
little less than two months, the seemingly innocent mourning activities on 
Beijing’s university campuses evolved into a near revolutionary popular 
movement. The dynamics of the movement were complex, but throughout the 
movement, movement organizers never failed to make use of the symbolic 
resources of political rituals such as commemorations and funerals to make claims, 
enhance publicity, and achieve mobilization. On May 1, the International Labor 
Day, for example, leading intellectuals issued an open letter to call on the Chinese 
government to recognize students’ request for dialogue with Li Peng, the Premier. 
On May 4, crowds estimated at three-hundred-thousand gathered on Tiananmen 
Square to mark the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. Fully 
aware of the symbolically charged event and place, students read a “New May 
Fourth Manifesto” outlining the historical mission of the contemporary student 
generation:  
Today, we are assembled here, not only to commemorate that monumental day but more 
importantly, to carry forth the May Fourth spirit of science and democracy. Today, in 
front of symbol of the Chinese nation, Tiananmen, we can proudly proclaim to all the 
people in our nation that we are worthy of the pioneers of seventy years ago.70 
 
Similarly, on May 16, the twenty-third anniversary of the official starting point of 
the Cultural Revolution, four influential writers, Ba Jin, Ai Qing, Liu Zaifu and 
Fan Zheng, issued a “May 16 Statement” denouncing May 16, 1966 as a symbol of 
autocracy and darkness and calling for democracy and the official recognition of 
the student movement as a patriotic movement. May 30 was the sixty-fourth 
anniversary of the May Thirtieth Movement. On that day in 1925, Shanghai 
workers and students assembled in the Shanghai International Settlement to 
demand the release of six Chinese students who had been arrested by the British. 
The British inspector ordered his men to fire, killing eleven demonstrators. The 
May 30 Movement had thus become another well-known student movement on the 
sacred calendar of the Chinese Communist Revolution. On May 30, 1989, the 
Autonomous Workers’ Federation was founded, signaling workers’ organizational 
support of the student movement. On the same day, the statue of the Goddess of 
Liberty was unveiled on Tiananmen Square, attracting the largest crowds before 
military repression. 
 
It is worth reiterating that the dates themselves had no intrinsic significance. 
Meanings were attached to them by movement organizers and other activists. One 
of the meanings of these anniversaries is that they should not be let slip by without 
some form of observation. For movement organizers and activists in 1989, this 
meant that each identifiable historical anniversary could be turned into an occasion 
of collective gathering and used to strengthen or create solidarity. In a drawn out 
movement without an effective SMO, fully exposed to unpredictable and yet 
powerful opponents, a strong sense of solidarity was essential for the movement to 
survive. The succession of historical anniversaries and dates of political 
commemoration provided an invaluable set of symbolic opportunities for 
sustaining solidarity. 
 
Again, we do not claim that the cultural debates that raged in 1988 in anticipation 
of the advent of 1989 caused the 1989 student movement. Politically sensitive 
minded figures like Su Xiaokang seemed to have a feeling of foreboding about 
1989. There was talk among small groups of students or public intellectuals that 
they needed to “do something” around May 4, 1989, in memory of that great 
historic movement. But there were neither concrete plans nor pre-existent 
movement organizations. The cultural debates in 1988 had served as loci for 
bringing together small groups of individuals. A sense of cultural crisis loomed 
heavy in the air. They were not the kind of resources that resource mobilization 
theorists would think of as necessary for movement mobilization. Yet viewed in 
retrospect and aided with a knowledge of the historical tradition of popular protest 
in twentieth century China,71
 
the torrent of cultural events in 1988 begin to assume 
the significance of some kind of necessary “preparatory” work for movement 
mobilization. In this sense, the year 1989 provided a rare historical opportunity for 
protest with its many important anniversaries.  
 
Discussion  
Our analysis of the 1989 protest movements does not so much refute as it does 
complement and specify the central elements of the political process model of 
social movements. The model relies upon three concepts to account for social 
movement emergence, mobilization, and success. These are the structure of 
political opportunities, collective action frames, and mobilizing social networks.72 
Because it is axiomatic that collective actors respond to opportunities and that 
insufficient opportunities for mobilization will result in movement failure or 
collapse, the challenge becomes to specify what provides such opportunities, why 
actors recognize and respond to them, and the possibilities and limits such 
opportunities provide. In our analysis we have shown how declining repression 
provides opportunities for dissident groups and subcultures of opposition to form. 
Official commemorations and similar political rituals require public participation, 
providing incentives for dissident groups to protest and to appeal to crowds in 
mobilizing support behind their calls for change. Such protests will remain 
scattered so long as repression remains continuous and effective and inadequate 
free social spaces are available to dissidents.  
 
The advantages of political commemorations for collective action frames are clear 
in our analysis. At state commemorations and during other political rituals, 
dissidents can attempt to discredit or recast official political frames. Given 
sufficient coordination and organization, dissidents may also develop their own 
commemorations that draw on elements of the oppositional political subcultures. 
These commemorations help to provide a public identity to a nascent opposition 
movement as well as establishing a repertoire of symbols, practices, and frames 
that dissidents and their supporters can incorporate into a broader movement. The 
symbolic dimension of collective protest also has a double-edged character. The 
sight of a dissident crowd is one kind of symbol, especially in the context of the 
mass media; the inverted symbols of dissident intellectuals are another kind of 
ideal intervention; both converge in an orchestrated protest more common to the 
rhythms of dissent in democratic societies.  
 
Our theory of political subcultures in movement emergence in authoritarian 
regimes builds on the insight that social resources such as interpersonal networks 
are a necessary element in organizing ongoing collective action. We have provided 
a theory of why individuals join subcultural groups and associate with dissident 
values and ideologies and under what circumstances they can grow into social 
movements. We have identified the ways in which political rituals help to generate 
the symbolic resources these networks need to build identity, solidarity, and shared 
injustice frames. 
 
In all three cases that we have examined, dissidents exploited the double-edged 
character of rituals in official political culture. But the dissident groups in 
Czechoslovakia and China developed a more extensive set of oppositional political 
rituals. This largely reflects the greater success they had in developing a political 
subculture with popular resonance. The Czech dissidents redirected official state 
commemorations of socialist heroes into anti-Communist demonstrations as their 
East German counterparts did. However, the Czechoslovak opposition developed a 
richer symbolic repertoire connected to commemorations of historical 
anniversaries. They seized upon culturally resonant dates as resources of collective 
action, demanding public recognition of events such as the 1968 invasion or the 
declaration of independence of the democratic republic of Czechoslovakia. The 
practices surrounding commemoration of the dissident martyr Jan Palach are an 
excellent example of the ritualized forms of protest that can be developed by 
dissident subcultures. Publically commemorating the suicide of Palach also meant 
engaging in a political ritual expressing opposition to the regime. Despite 
extraordinary government efforts to suppress the memory of Palach’s sacrifice, and 
the demands for democratization and national autonomy that he represented, 
opposition groups made repeated efforts to stage political commemorations of his 
death. Palach became a sacred symbol of true patriotism, sacrifice and national 
honor in the face of Communist tyranny.  
 
Again, in all three cases, once repeated protests got under way they quickly began 
to take on ritual elements of their own. Leipzig’s peaceful Monday demonstrations 
are a well-known example of this. In all three countries protesters assembled 
habitually at churches or at politically significant public places, such as Leipzig’s 
Karl Marx Square, Prague’s Wenceslas Square, or Tiananmen Square, carried 
candles in twilight processions, laid flowers and wreaths at the graves of heroes or 
at sites of police violence, sang political songs and religious hymns, and in Prague 
they jingled their keys by the tens of thousands to create a chiming music meant to 
awaken their erstwhile jailers.  
 
However, although the Czechoslovak and Chinese oppositions remained weak in 
comparison with the state, they made more productive use of the symbolic 
resources of the broader national political culture than was the case in the GDR. 
They created rituals of opposition linked to historical anniversaries of important 
events in national history. This patriotism connected intellectuals to ordinary 
people, dissidents to citizens. The failure of the East German opposition to exploit 
national issues can be understood, in part, by reference to German history and the 
formation of a socialist intelligentsia in the GDR. East Germany’s antifascist 
intellectuals avoided commemorating nationalist icons and dates because of the 
legacy of Nazism and German defeat in 1945, thereby impoverishing the symbolic 
repertoire upon which they could draw.73
 
Building on the legacy of nationalist 
martyrs, the Czechoslovaks and Chinese not only challenged state sponsored 
rituals to express opposition, but created widely recognized political icons and 
symbols of their own that connected them with patriotic traditions. This populist 
nationalism had a broad appeal outside of dissident subcultures. In identifying 
culturally facilitated and constrained limits on political action we can understand 
why patriotic student groups and ordinary workers became enthusiastic allies of 
the dissidents in Czechoslovakia and China in 1989, while students in the GDR 
played almost no role at all in anti-Communist demonstrations and workers 
quickly abandoned dissident causes once the Communist party capitulated. 
Indeed, even the spaces where the rituals took place in China and Czechoslovakia 
were fraught with symbolic and emotional meaning  Prague’s Wenceslas Square 
and Beijing’s Tiananmen Square are themselves symbols of the Czech and 
Chinese nations. 
 
Repressive states, like dissidents, learn from past experience. In an official 
account of the events of the 1989 student movement in China, the opportunity 
presented by an historical anniversary for dissident organizing is acknowledged in 
a description of the months leading up to April1989, “In order to stir up turmoil in 
China and subvert the People’s Republic, a tiny handful of people engaged in 
political conspiracy have for years made ideological, public opinion and 
organizational preparation.... They planned a large scale move on the 70
th 




During the recent tenth anniversary of 
the crackdown against the student democracy movement in Beijing on June 4, 
1999 state authorities went to great lengths to prevent the occasion from being 
exploited by the opposition. Citing the need for “renovations,” the authorities 
entirely closed of Tiananmen Square to the public for weeks before the 
anniversary of the violence. Discussion of the 1989 events was tightly controlled 
and media access to opposition groups and prominent dissidents was greatly 
restricted. In the days before the anniversary of the massacre, scores of dissidents, 
intellectuals and democracy activists were arrested or placed under surveillance. 
Scattered protests apparently still took place, but the opposition was denied a 
broad public forum on which to stage protests or make critical statements.75 
 
Conclusion  
We have argued in this article that in 1989 collective actors in Eastern Europe and 
China made strategic use of political rituals as symbolic resources of collective 
action and that such uses contributed significantly to movement mobilization. In 
making this argument we have drawn on cultural approaches to the study of 
collective action to complement the usual emphasis on social resources, injustice 
frames, and political opportunities found in the social movement literature. Our 
approach links symbolic and strategic elements of collective action in accounting 
for the tactics of dissidents groups and their efforts to mobilize popular support. 
We are attentive both to the actor’s capacity for intentional action and the 
mediating and shaping effects of structure. We reveal not only the intentional, 
manifest purpose of political rituals but also their latent and unintended effects. We 
have shown how political commemorations can be conceived of as symbolic 
resources of collective action. Collective actors may well exploit rituals linked to 
anniversaries and similar commemorations outside of repressive settings, but we 
think they acquire added importance in authoritarian regimes, and especially in 
Leninist societies. This is because resources are monopolized by the state while the 
networks, organizations, and institutions of civil society are absent or weak. Under 
these conditions, symbolic resources such as commemorative rituals present 
themselves as alternative resources for political challengers. 
 
Although various scholars call for greater attention to cultural processes in social 
movements, the analytical contribution of these studies is often unclear. We have 
identified one set of cultural processes, political rituals, whose role in collective 
action has not been carefully examined but that is quite relevant to understanding 
protest mobilization in the 1989 democracy movements. We have identified the 
conditions of collective action in repressive regimes and the ways in which cultural 
resources like rituals can empower action in an otherwise impoverished regime. 
We go beyond an account of dissimulation and hidden, “everyday” forms of 
resistance by revealing how dissident actors in political subcultures can make 
active use of cultural resources in organizing collective action. Indeed, for 
opposition groups in state socialist contexts, anniversary celebrations and like 
events may be the only occasions to address large public gatherings and reach out 
to unorganized interests and grievances.  
 
We have shown how a range of political rituals associated with commemorations 
may be of use to movements partially because of the opportunities  especially to 
reach an audience and avoid repression  these events may offer and partially 
because rituals of this kind can generate symbolic resources of collective action. 
Public commemorations of politically sacred objects such as anniversaries, the 
memory of political martyrs, and national holidays are moments of vulnerability 
built into the structure of authoritarian regimes. Public commemorations can help 
challengers to overcome, even if only temporarily, some of the obstacles to 
mobilization.  
 
We think that what is at stake in such protests is, in part, opportunities for 
mobilization. But there is also something more than this  the effort to generate 
publicity through the struggle over the production and reproduction of symbolic 
goods associated with the politically sacred. In their desperate efforts to 
communicate with a broader public and destabilize the state, it was in the interest 
of dissidents to disrupt official political rituals. And, when given sufficient 
opportunity and organizational resources, dissident forces also tried to define a set 
of symbolic resources and repertoires of their own. In order to do so, the 
movements of 1989 turned to rituals linked to political commemorations. Although 
clever use of commemorations alone does not guarantee the success or failure of a 
protest movement, our analysis of the movements of 1989 suggests that attention to 
the role of political rituals may help to account for the timing, organization, and 
symbolic practices of collective action.  
 
Political commemorations also play a role in the emergence of movements out of 
an alternative political culture of loosely organized dissident groups. Symbols, 
dates, and martyr figures charged with political meaning and emotional resonance 
are used by dissidents to sustain opposition in the face of overwhelmingly 
repression and seemingly hopeless struggles. Commemoration rituals link the 
political past to an imagined future. They evoke, generate, and communicate the 
important sense of collective memory that sustains movement participation, even 
under difficult circumstances and high levels of repression. They help to marshal 
the past in support of present and future goals, linking collective actors to a 
glorious past. Marx understood this in his essay on the Eighteenth Brumaire. Just 
as Louis Bonaparte wore the mask of Napoleon and the revolutionaries of 1848 
that of 1789, in a sense the movements of 1989 also portrayed themselves as the 
successors of past exemplars.76
 
Commemorative rituals helped to establish this 
link. The East German dissidents walked in the path of Rosa Luxemburg, the 
Czechs declared themselves willing to repeat the sacrifices of Palach and Opletal, 
and the Beijing students of 1989 evoked the lineage of patriotic heroes dating back 
to the May Fourth Movement.  
 
Ongoing repression and extensive measures to close of the symbolic resources 
presented by the political rituals are testimony to the fact that regime elites are 
generally well aware of the importance of such events to the opposition. If 
confronted by a high degree of repression and concerted efforts to stifle protest at 
widely recognized events, challengers may be able to stage effective protests when 
they manage to take their government by surprise. Although regimes may tempora-
rily succeed in closing of such opportunities, the historical and cultural resonance 
of certain dates may always nevertheless represent moments of danger even for 
repressive regimes.  
 
An authoritarian regime may secure compliance so long as its power seems 
unassailable, but once its control is threatened, it may suddenly experience a revolt 
that is a more accurate reflection of popular sentiments. The coercion, repression, 
and surveillance that the regime relies upon to crush challenges to its authority 
unintentionally promote the formation of political subcultures that seek out free 
social spaces where they can communicate and organize. Even if dissident groups 
are incapable of directly challenging a regime, they develop an alternative political 
culture that sustains opposition in spite of repression. Given sufficient space to 
organize, these dissident groups can form movements that have the capacity to 
mobilize a revolt against the system once its power begins to erode.  
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Notes  
1. The GDR and Czechoslovakia are widely defined as hardline post-totalitarian  regimes in 
1989. Both explicitly rejected Gorbachev’s calls for reform in the socialist world and proclaimed 
their allegiance to the Leninist model. These regimes maintained extensive state security 
apparatuses and continued to harass, jail and exile prominent dissidents. Neither regime was split 
by a struggle between hardliners and reformers and neither permitted market reforms or 
decentralization of any kind. The case of China is somewhat more complex. Despite extensive 
market reforms that appear to have weakened political control at universities and other 
institutions, the party rejected calls for political pluralism and actively repressed dissidence. 
Recent documentation suggests that, beneath the surface unity of the party leadership in the 
People’s Republic, a major split developed between advocates and opponents of liberalization. 
The seriousness of the division helps to account for why it took the regime so long to respond 
with effective repression to the student mobilization of 1989. However, as Dingxin Zhao notes, 
no major party leader publically encouraged or facilitated the Beijing student movement. The 
chief difference of opinion within the party appeared to be how the movement should be 
suppressed. See The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s Decision to Use Force 
Against their Own People, compiled by Zhang Liang and edited by Andrew J. Nathan and Perry 
Linx (New York: Public Afairs, 2001). Also see Dingxin Zhao, “State Society Relations and the 
Discourses and Activists of the 1989 Beijing Student Movement,”  American Journal of 
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